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Abstract
Wage expectations for full- and part-time employment are key for understanding
the labor supply decisions of women. However, whether women expect different
wages between part-time and full-time work is not fully understood. Using Ger-
man survey data, I quantify the expected full-time/part-time wage differential for
a representative sample of female workers. I document that women, on average,
expect only minor part-time wage penalties (1-3 percent). Comparing beliefs to
selectivity-adjusted estimates of the part-time wage gap indicates that women’s
mean expectations are realistic. I also show that women with children and those
in managerial positions expect sizeable part-time wage cuts, with mothers over-
estimating the part-time wage penalty.
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1. Introduction
Many women will work part-time at some stage of their working career. This paper analyzes if
women expect wage cuts for part-time work and evaluates if these beliefs are correct. Expecta-
tions about the wage impact of working part-time determine key labor supply choices women
face throughout their lives: reducing hours to engage in care tasks or increasing them past the
child-rearing years are examples of decisions that depend on expected wage offers in part-time
and in full-time employment. Previous studies focus on estimating if a causal part-time wage
gap exists, but unless one is willing to impose rational expectations, the expected part-time
wage effect of real individuals remains unidentified.
This paper measures and assesses women’s subjective expectations about the part-time wage
effect in the context of the German labor market, offering two main results: First, I present rep-
resentative survey evidence that women, on average, expect near-constant wages for part-time
and full-time positions. Mean expected part-time wage penalties range between 1.45 and 2.78
percent and are statistically not different from zero. Hence, women expect neither a significant
wage cut for part-time work, nor a wage premium for working full-time. This finding is robust
to various sensitivity checks. Second, I show that women’s expectations are realistic on aver-
age. Selectivity-corrected estimates yield only minor first-order wage effects of part-time work
among women, in line with the existing literature (Gallego-Granados, 2019; Paul, 2016; Booth
and Wood, 2008; Connolly and Gregory, 2008; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Aaronson and
French, 2004; Wolf, 2002, to cite a few). The large raw wage gap between part-time and full-
time working women observed in many countries is almost entirely driven by job segmentation
and worker selection in part-time jobs, including differences in experience. Conditional on ex-
perience, first-order wage effects of part-time work are negligible on average.2 In a final step,
I study the heterogeneity in expectations and compare subgroup beliefs with estimated part-
time wage effects. I document that expectations significantly correlate with motherhood and
with having managerial responsibilities. Both mothers and managers expect sizeable part-time
wage penalties exceeding the population mean in expectations by factors four and nine, respec-
tively. While estimates confirm that women in management positions face significantly larger
2In the long-term, part-time employment can also generate second-order wage effects by
causing productivity losses or different rates of promotions that in turn compress wages.
Second-order effects can arise as part-time work becomes persistent, creating a ’part-time ex-
perience penalty’ that goes beyond the direct first-order effect of working part-time in a given
period. Unless noted otherwise, this paper refers to the first-order part-time wage effect.
1
wage penalties for working part-time than non-managers, I show that German mothers do not
experience disproportional part-time wage cuts and, hence, tend to overestimate the negative
part-time wage effect.
To derive these findings, I present a two-step empirical strategy. First, I study women’s wage
expectations, using novel data from the Innovation Sample of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP-IS), a representative survey of German households. To identify expectations
about the part-time wage effect, I use a within-subject design, thus allowing me to compare
the part-time and the full-time scenarios at the individual respondent level. Specifically, I elicit
respondents’ expected gross income for a hypothetical switch between working full-time at 40
hours and part-time at 20 hours, ceteris paribus, and utilize information on current earnings
and agreed working hours to measure the expected part-time wage effect. For robustness, I also
check if results differ when working hours are defined to include overtime and when expec-
tations are constructed using probability intervals instead of numerical point estimates. In the
second step, I estimate the first-order wage effect of working part-time econometrically and use
these estimates as a benchmark to assess if women’s expectations are correct. To do so, I esti-
mate Mincer-type log wage equations and then use coefficient estimates to isolate conditional
part-time wage gaps. I account for the endogeneity of wages and working hours by estimating
the wage process conditional on participation and on selection into part-time and full-time em-
ployment. First, I use standard ‘reduced-form’ techniques, including fixed effects regression
and ordered-probit Heckman sample selection. Next, I build a static structural discrete choice
model of female labor supply and estimate wages jointly with a multinomial logit hours equa-
tion, building on Van Soest (1995) and Francesconi (2002). I estimate the model on a sample of
German women that is comparable to the SOEP-IS sample, exploiting the longitudinal dimen-
sion of the larger German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to model selection. For identification,
I use actual transitions between employment states, changes in socio-demographic characteris-
tics and non-linearities in the German tax and benefit system. Throughout all analyses, I use
various measures of working hours and part-time status to ensure that results do not depend
on a specific hours threshold or on the exclusion of overtime. Using the main specification
of the structural model, I compute a selectivity-corrected benchmark estimate of the part-time
wage effect and compare this benchmark with the expected part-time wage effect of women
constructed in the first step.
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The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, I show that, on average, women have sur-
prisingly realistic expectations in an important labor market domain. Although the observed
wage gaps between part-time and full-time workers are large (10-20 percent), women’s ex-
pectations about the part-time wage effect are close to econometrically estimated wage gaps
(around zero). In times of ever-growing evidence on behavioral anomalies in many domains,
it seems to emerge that subjective income expectations are less affected by beliefs-biases (Bre-
unig et al., 2019; Zafar, 2011).3 The risk to develop beliefs-biases depends on agents’ informa-
tion sets and increases with the complexity of the decision problem. Individuals, on average,
have more experience in the domain of labor income, than, for instance, in the financial mar-
ket domain. Furthermore, expectation formation concerning the short-run is less complex than
belief-formation requiring long-run extrapolation. This paper adds to the literature on subjec-
tive income expectations, showcasing that women, on average, have realistic expectations about
the first-order part-time wage effect.
Second, this paper contributes to our understanding of observed choice patterns in many OECD
labor markets, where female part-time shares reach levels of almost 60 percent.4 While child
care availability (Müller and Wrohlich, 2020), inflexible work contracts (Manning and Petron-
golo, 2008) or tax incentives (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2004) are well-identified determinants of
female labor supply, wage expectations deliver an additional mechanism explaining both mo-
bility and persistence in women’s hours choices. The beliefs documented in this paper can
rationalize why few women hesitate to reduce hours to engage in care work; at the same time,
they explain why many postpone a return to full-time employment after spending years in part-
time employment. If women expect neither a direct wage cut when reducing hours, nor an
immediate reward in response to an increase, there are no first-order wage incentives to prefer
3Behavioral anomalies can be classified into nonstandard preferences, beliefs, and decision-
making (DellaVigna, 2009). Empirical work shows that workers overpredict their produc-
tivity (Hoffman and Burks, 2017), the unemployed overestimate their job finding probabil-
ity (Spinnewijn, 2015), and employees overrate the performance of their own company (Oyer
and Schaefer, 2005). Agents’ systematic mistakes can have implications for welfare analysis
(Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007) and behavioral economists have made efforts to augment standard
economic models with behavioral elements. However, divergence from standard rational be-
liefs comes at the expense of model simplicity. Given the appeal of rational expectations for
modeling purposes, it is central to uncover under which circumstances the standard model re-
mains appropriate.
4The female part-time share reached 58 percent in the Netherlands in 2018, in Germany and
the UK the share is around 40 percent. OECD (2020), Part-time employment rate (indicator).
doi: 10.1787/f2ad596c-en (Accessed on 30 January 2020)
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full- over part-time in a given period. This can create an indifference between remaining in
part-time just a bit longer and resuming a full-time job. However, this indifference and the per-
sistence in part-time employment it can create have important second-order effects. Numerous
studies point out that part-time work is harmful if it becomes persistent because there is no
return to work experience accumulated during periods of part-time employment (Connolly and
Gregory, 2010; Fernández-Kranz et al., 2015; Blundell et al., 2016; Eisenhauer et al., 2020).
Expectations about the short-run impact of part-time work can generate persistent part-time
employment if agents are either myopic, that is, not forward-looking, or if they are present-
biased, thereby prioritizing immediate over future payoffs.5 The beliefs documented in this
paper help explain why women often make suboptimal choices that harm their labor market
outcomes in the long-run.
Third, and finally, this paper contributes to the growing literature using stated expectations
data to overcome the standard identification problem in revealed preference analysis (Manski,
2004; Zafar, 2011). Specifically, the results presented here provide a behavioral foundation for
economists modeling female labor supply. Labor supply models require an assumption about
the wage-hours locus and there are competing approaches in the literature. Standard discrete
choice models in the tradition of Van Soest (1995) impose constant wage offers for full-time
and part-time work, implicitly assuming that decision-makers do not expect a part-time wage
effect. Others estimate counterfactual part-time and full-time wage offers, which translates into
the implicit assumption that real agents’ wage expectations match econometric predictions of
the part-time wage effect (Francesconi, 2002; Löffler et al., 2014). So far, the choice between
competing models is guided by whether researchers believe a rational agent should take into
account a part-time wage effect. However, whether agents actually expect different wage of-
fers in part-time and in full-time employment is ultimately an empirical question. This paper
answers this question for a representative sample of female workers, and can serve as a behav-
ioral guideline for researchers striving to capture key features of real agents’ decision-processes
within economic models.
The two questions addressed in this paper - do people expect wage cuts for part-time work
and does a part-time wage effect exist - received differential attention in the existing literature.
5This paper does not speak to individuals’ expectations about the second-order effects of
part-time work. The work by Eisenhauer et al. (2020) suggests women overestimate future
wage growth in part-time, which can also explain persistence for forward-looking agents.
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The first question remains largely unanswered. As far as I am aware, no other study analyzed
women’s subjective expectations about the first-order wage impact of transitioning between
full- and part-time. Currently, there exists only one related study by Stevens et al. (2004);
they survey British women about various aspects of their work-life balance, including beliefs
about firm-specific part-time wage gaps. They report that 74% of surveyed women believe their
employer pays part-time and full-time workers the same hourly wage. While in line with the
self-beliefs presented here, Stevens et al. (2004) do not measure women’s expectations about
their own wage effect when transitioning from full- to part-time. Eisenhauer et al. (2020) study
women’s self-beliefs about future returns to hours worked, hence focusing on the second-order
effects of part-time work on future wage growth. Breunig et al. (2019) also study the long-
run income expectations of households, but do not distinguish between part-time and full-time
work. Thus, this paper clearly advances our understanding of women’s wage expectations for
part-time employment, which remains a prevalent labor supply choice in many female labor
markets. The second question addressed in this paper received considerably more attention.
To economize on space here, I review the vast theoretical and empirical literature about part-
time wage effects in section 2. I build on this active literature in at least two important ways.
First, I add yet another empirical strategy to the multitude of existing approaches that isolate
part-time wage effects conditional on selection (for an up-to-date review, also see Gallego-
Granados, 2019).6 Specifically, I extend a static structural discrete choice model of female
labor supply similar to Van Soest (1995) with features proposed by Francesconi (2002). This
allows me to estimate the part-time wage effect conditional on a rich selection model that
describes the hours choice through a consumption-leisure trade-off, capturing detailed features
of the German tax and welfare regime. Second, using up-to-date representative panel data
from Germany, I confirm the main finding from previous literature: if a first-order wage effect
for working part-time exists, it is at most small, at least for women. This consensus across
different countries, contexts and methodologies is striking, thus providing a convincing answer
to the question if there exists a direct wage effect of working part-time.
6Manning and Petrongolo (2008) use reweighting and standard Heckman selection-
correction or condition on occupation to eliminate the most important sources of selection bias.
Others use simultaneous wage-hours models (Wolf, 2002), random effects with a dynamic
multinomial probit component for employment choices (Paul, 2016), and semi-parametric es-
timation that builds on imputation-based sample selection correction for conditional quantiles
(Gallego-Granados, 2019).
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the mechanisms that
generate part-time wage gaps and reviews previous empirical findings. Section 4 describes the
empirical approach. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
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2. Part-Time Wage Gaps: Mechanisms and Empirical Literature
This section reviews the existing literature on part-time wage effects. There are three broad ex-
planations why part-time workers earn lower wages than full-time workers: First, the jobs they
do are different. Second, the workers themselves are different. Third, firms face different costs
when employing workers part-time or full-time and compensate by paying different wages to
otherwise identical workers in identical jobs. I review these three mechanisms in turn, starting
with the last. The section concludes by summarizing empirical estimates of the part-time wage
effect from the existing literature.
2.1. Firms’ Cost Functions
Firms face fixed costs of labor for recruitment, training, and coordination. One argument pro-
posed by Oi (1962) and later developed by Montgomery (1988) is that these fixed costs pay
off less for part-time workers who work fewer hours; hence, firms pay them lower wages to
offset relatively higher costs.7 Goldin (2014) extends this argument, showing that coordination
costs can be higher for part-time workers. She finds that returns to both long hours and to
particular hours, for instance to being around when colleagues are, increase if coordination and
transaction costs are high. Thus, firms reward workers who facilitate smooth workflows and do
not cause communication or delegation costs by working irregular hours. Another reason why
part-time workers may be less valuable to firms are productivity detriments caused by every-
day ‘set-up’ costs. Set-up costs create rising marginal products of daily working hours until a
‘fatigue’ threshold, resulting in an S-shaped relationship between hours and productivity, and
ultimately, wages (Barzel, 1973; Moffitt, 1984). Others argue that fewer hours may reduce
fatigue effects and unproductive ‘slack’, rationalizing positive part-time premia (Tummers and
Woittiez, 1991). Empirically, researchers analyze if firms reward workers with identical char-
acteristics differently in part-time and in full-time employment, which could point to different
cost functions for different hours arrangements. However, firms that do face higher costs when
employing workers part-time may not always have the wriggle room to adjust hourly wages
to match their costs. Worker protection regulation and principles of equal treatment limit their
capabilities for cutting wages when their employees reduce hours. Instead, firms may choose to
not offer flexible hours for all positions, which explains why part-time and full-time employees
often do different jobs.




The segmentation of jobs into those that are exclusively offered on a full-time basis and those
that are ‘part-time compatible’ constitutes a challenge for researchers seeking to identify the
true part-time wage penalty. Part-time workers are heavily concentrated in low-wage sec-
tors and in work arrangements with fixed-term contracts, often deemed as marginal or sec-
ondary employment (Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2011). Wage gains generated by
changes in the skill content of work due to technological change also fall exclusively upon full-
time workers, spreading wages even further between sectors (Gallego-Granados, 2019; Black
and Spitz-Oener, 2010). Notably, the task-level segregation of jobs hurts women more than
men and remains a major obstacle toward full ‘gender convergence’ in pay (Goldin, 2014). Job
segmentation also poses an identification challenge for researchers because it generates addi-
tional job mobility. If firms do not offer comparable part-time positions, workers seeking to
reduce hours may have to change employers or move to a different position within their firm.
This involuntary mobility comes with the risk of losing job-specific human capital, or making
an occupational downward move; both can in turn compress wages (Manning and Petrongolo,
2008). There is no consensus whether one should include mobility-driven wage losses when
estimating the part-time wage effect. An all-encompassing definition of the part-time penalty
can include mobility-induced wage cuts, capturing the constraints and costs many workers face
when making the transition to part-time in real life. If, instead, the goal is to test some of
the theoretical predictions presented above, one needs rich enough data to isolate the part-time
wage penalty for identical jobs from wage losses that are due to changes of employer, jobs, or
tasks.
2.3. Worker Selection
Finally, part-time workers may earn lower wages because they differ in relevant ways from
full-time workers. Some of these differences already exist when people initially select into
part-time and full-time jobs, reflecting differences in preferences or constraints. One example
is given by Adda et al. (2017), who show that career choices mirror worker differences in
desired fertility, with women who have higher preferences for children choosing family friendly
occupations - with the ‘amenity’ of part-time work - more often.8 Other differences can arise
8The fact that workers accept lower wages for part-time positions is sometimes interpreted
within the narrative of compensating wage differentials. If workers value the flexibility to re-
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between previously identical workers, only emerging subsequently, after employment choices
have persisted for prolonged periods of time. The most prominent example is the differential
accumulation of human capital in part-time and full-time jobs (Blundell et al., 2016). Put
differently, it is part-time work itself that makes part-time workers less productive, especially if
the choice to work part-time becomes permanent. Work experience appears to be most valuable
if it is accumulated in full-time, which can generate second-order effects and create a part-time
experience penalty that goes beyond the direct wage effect of working part-time in a given
period. In a related argument, Connolly and Gregory (2010) highlight the ‘dual nature’ of part-
time work: a transition to part-time can both harm and support a career, depending on whether
the move is permanent, marking the beginning of a “part-time/non-employment cycle,” or a
temporary “interlude” that maintains labor force attachment and leads back to a full-time career.
Last, but not least, institutions and norms also matter. The extent to which part-time and full-
time workers differ also depends on the labor force participation of women, in general, and of
mothers, in particular. Whether and which women work, in turn, reflects the gender norms of
a society and the political environment, such as whether part-time work and non-employment
are incentivized through the joint taxation of married couples or if affordable child care reduces
the opportunity costs for working mothers. In Germany, the selection of women into part-
time has undergone a major transition, going from positive in the early 1990s to null, if not
negative, in the 2010s (Gallego-Granados, 2019; Biewen et al., 2018). In the end, regardless if
the differences between part-time and full-time workers are inherent, acquired along the way,
or induced by institutions - taken together, these constitute the main identification challenge
for researchers striving to estimate the part-time effect. A vast literature has emerged around
the task of adjusting wage differentials for the non-random distribution of dissimilar workers
across full-time and part-time jobs. The next section summarizes the main findings from this
empirical literature.
duce working hours, they may accept lower wages for part-time positions in return, especially
if part-time jobs are scarce. An alternative reading is that more vulnerable employees face
constraints that firms can exploit. Ermisch and Wright (1993) point out that monopsonistic
employers can exploit the restricted geographic mobility and lower labor supply elasticities of
potential part-time workers - often women with young children who face larger spatial con-
straints - by offering them lower wages.
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2.4. Estimated Part-Time Wage Effects in Previous Literature
Estimates of the part-time wage effect in previous literature differ across countries and over
time and depend on the definition of part-time status as well as sample composition, most cru-
cially, whether the sample includes men and workers in marginal part-time contracts (Table 1).
I broadly summarize the literature with four main findings: (1) adjusted gaps are substantially
lower than raw gaps, in most cases adjustments reduce observed wage gaps by at least half, in
some cases they even turn the raw penalty into a part-time premium; (2) adjusted gaps are larger
for men than for women, no paper finds part-time premia for men in their main specification;
(3) fixed effects estimates yield smaller part-time wage gaps than estimates that do not exclu-
sively use within-individual variation; and (4) the wage exogeneity assumption is problematic,
most studies attempt to jointly model wages and hours or correct for selection into part-time.
For German females, estimates of the raw wage gap are around 20 percent including marginal
part-time and adjusted penalties range from average part-time premia of eight percent (Gallego-
Granados, 2019) to penalties of nine percent for short part-time work up to 15 hours per week
(Paul, 2016). These findings confirm earlier results for German women by Wolf (2002), who
reports lower wages only when working very few hours, but a flat wage-hours locus between
20 - 37 hours. Overall, most empirical studies yield only small first-order part-time wage ef-
fects for women, the bulk of observed pay differentials between workers is explained by job
segmentation and worker selection into part-time.
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Table 1: Part-Time Wage Effects in Previous Literature
Authors (Year) Unadjusted Adjusted Country/ Years Data
Gallego-Granados (2019) 9-19 -8-7 West GER/ 1990-2009 SOEP
Blundell et al. (2016) n.r. 5-8 UK/ 1991-2008 BHPS
Paul (2016) 4-32 -2- 9 GER/ 1984 - 2011 SOEP
Fernández-Kranz et al. (2015) 31-37 6-8 Spain/ 1996-2006 CSWH
Preston and Yu (2015) 15-22 -4-9 Australia/ 2010 Australia at Work
Matteazzi et al. (2014) 8-22 -20-15 Cross Country/ 2009 EU-SILC
Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) 35-38 9-14 Spain/ 1996-2006 CSWH
Fouarge and Muffels (2009) n.r. 0-5 Cross Country/ 1984-2006 SEP, BHPS, SOEP
Bardasi and Gornick (2008) -1-22 -3-18 Cross Country/ 1994-1995 LIS
Booth and Wood (2008) 1-13 -16 to -10 Australia/ 2001-2004 HILDA
Connolly and Gregory (2008) 15-29 3-11 UK/ 1975-2001 NESPD
Manning and Petrongolo (2008) 25-27 3-10 UK/ 2001-2003 LFS
Mumford and Smith (2008) 12-18 0-11 UK/ 2004 WERS04
Hardoy and Schøne (2006) 5 0 Norway/ 1997-1998 LLS
Hirsch (2005) 26-49 -5-18 US/ 1995-2002 CPS
Aaronson and French (2004) 20-56 -1-25 US/ 1968-2000 PSID, HRS, ORG, CPS
Wolf (2002) n.r. 0-1 West GER/ 1995 SOEP
Averett and Hotchkiss (1996) 27-62 7-50 US/ 1989 CPS
Gornick and Jacobs (1996) 8-28 -19-23 Cross Country/ 1986-87 LIS
Ermisch and Wright (1993) 17 8 UK/ 1980 WES
Blank (1990) 19-26 -17-18 US/ 1987 CPS
Simpson (1986) 31 10 Canada/ 1981 Survey of Work History
Notes: Mean or median wage gaps (log difference*100%) rounded to the closest integer value. Negative values denote part-time premia. Some papers
include males. All reporting errors are my own. Literature review incomplete, suggestions welcome. The review does not contain results by McGinnity
and McManus (2007); Green and Ferber (2005); Montgomery and Cosgrove (1995) due to lack of access. n.r.= not reported.
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3. Research Design
This section describes the empirical approach, which consists of two steps. In the first step,
I estimate women’s expectations about the part-time wage effect. For identification, I use a
within-subject design. This allows me to compare the part-time and the full-time scenarios
at the individual respondent level, thereby shutting off an important channel of selection bias
by construction (section 3.1). In the second step of the empirical analysis, I estimate the part-
time wage effect econometrically and use these estimates as a benchmark to assess if women’s
expectations are correct (section 3.2).
3.1. Expectations about the Part-Time Wage Effect
To measure expectations about the part-time wage effect, I utilize a within-subject design that
provides information on both the full-time and the part-time scenario for the same respondent.
Specifically, respondents are asked to consider a hypothetical switch of employment status,
based on the following survey instrument if the respondent is employed full-time:9
‘Please imagine you were to switch to a part-time job from now on, working 20 hours per
week. Please only consider part-time jobs that you could carry-out with your current level of
qualification. Which monthly gross income do you expect to earn when working part-time at
20 hours per week?’
Part-time working individuals are asked a corresponding question that enquires about their
expected income when switching to a full-time position at 40 hours per week. I construct each
respondent’s expected part-time wage effect as follows:
Let n denote the individual respondent who is in one of two states of the world j, working
either full-time (FT) or part-time (PT), jn ∈ {FT,PT}. Based on n′s current working hours,
hn, her current monthly gross labor income, Yn and her reported expected monthly gross labor
income for a hypothetical switch between full-time and part-time, Ỹn, her expected part-time
wage effect p̃n is given by,
p̃n = (lwFT,n− lwPT,n)×100% (1)
9The survey instrument is based on a filter question that splits according to self-reported
employment status.
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where lw j,n is the natural logarithm of current or expected gross hourly wage, obtained by














if jn 6= j
(2)
with h j ∈ (40,20), as specified in the question on expected income. The sample mean across
all individual respondents yields the expected part-time wage effect, p̃.
To keep the survey instrument simple, the question does not specify whether working hours
include overtime. Arguably, the more natural reading of the question is in terms of agreed
contractual hours, therefore p̃ defines current working hours hn as agreed hours in the main
specification. However, to allow for the possibility that individuals read the question differently
and also account for overtime, I specify a second measure of the expected part-time wage effect
that uses actual hours, including overtime, for additional robustness.
The within-subject design shuts off an important channel of selection bias because expected
wage offers for part-time and full-time work are compared within rather than across individuals.
The underlying assumption is that respondents’ current employment status does not affect the
way they report counterfactual expectations (no cognitive dissonance). To provide descriptive
evidence that this assumption is warranted in this setting, I test if mean expectations differ for
full-time and part-time workers.
The question fixes qualification requirements, encouraging respondents to consider the impact
of reducing hours in a ceteris paribus scenario. This should limit the extent to which people
simultaneously account for occupational downgrading, upgrading or job switching. However,
the survey instrument is not explicit in this regard and hence one cannot rule out that some
individuals do make these kinds of adjustments. Therefore, the derived measure of the expected
part-time wage effect is a broad one, potentially encompassing expected mobility-induced wage
losses. Consequently, the estimates in this paper can be interpreted as an upper bound of
women’s expected wage penalties.
In the main specification, expectations are identified directly from reported Euro amounts. As
a sensitivity check, I also construct estimates of the subjective mean probabilistically, using the
13
percent chance respondents expect to earn less than 80 percent and more than 120 percent of
their individual-specific point estimate (Appendix C.1).
3.2. Estimation of the Part-Time Wage Effect
To compute the benchmark part-time wage effect, I estimate Mincer-type log wage equations
and then use coefficient estimates to isolate conditional part-time wage gaps. I account for
the endogeneity of wages and working hours by estimating the wage process conditional on
selection into employment states. First, I use ‘reduced-form’ techniques including fixed effects
regression and ordered-probit Heckman sample selection (section 3.2.1), then I build a struc-
tural discrete choice model of female labor supply to estimate wages jointly with a multinomial
logit hours equation (section 3.2.2).
3.2.1. Reduced-form
Individual n at time t is observed in one out of three mutually exclusive choice categories
jn ∈ {1,2,3}, where the choice set j is defined as 1 = FT (full-time), 2 = PT (part-time), and
3 = OLF (out of labor force). Let wn denote n′s wage if n is working at time t.10
Combined Wage Equation
A single combined log wage equation for employed women, jn ∈ {FT,PT}, is given by
ln(wn) = α +β ·1( jn = PT )+Z′nγ +µn + εn (3)
where 1(.) indicates current employment status jn and β is the parameter of interest, measured
conditional on a vector of exogenous covariates, Zn, and an individual-specific fixed effect,
µn. The vector Zn collects basic controls for years of education, a quadratic in part-time and
full-time work experience (in years), as well as binary indicators for region (East/West) and
immigrant background; if specified broadly Zn additionally contains occupation major group
(1-digit ISCO-88), industry (2-digit NACE), linear and quadratic tenure, as well as binary in-
dicators for firm size (> 200), public sector and fixed term contract. In the combined wage
equation, the parameter vector γ , constant α and random shocks εn are constrained to be con-
stant across j.
Separate Wage Equations
10We drop time subscript t for better readability.
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Next, parameters and disturbances may vary over jn ∈ {FT,PT},
ln(w jn) = α j +Z′nγ j +µ jn + ε jn (4)
yielding separate wage processes for part-time and full-time workers as in standard Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition analyses (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973; Jann, 2008). The part-time
wage effect can no longer be measured through a constant β , instead counterfactual full-time
wages must be predicted for part-time workers and vice versa, holding fixed individual-specific
characteristics (endowments). A part-time wage penalty then unfolds if parameters vary across
j such that the ‘returns’ to identical characteristics differ between part-time and full-time; for
instance if the returns to work experience or to having a permanent contract differ across em-
ployment states.
Ordered-Probit Selection Rule
Estimating the wage equations based on employed women alone can lead to inconsistent co-
efficient estimates and hence biased part-time wage effects (Heckman, 1979). Non-random
choices of part-time and full-time employment generate additional sample selection (Ermisch
and Wright, 1993; Paci et al., 1995). To account for the endogeneity of wages and working
hours, consider a generalized two-step Heckman estimator as described in Chiburis and Lok-




where the latent categorical selection variable j∗n is unobserved, Wn is a vector of individual-
specific instruments of observed employment status jn ∈ {FT,PT,OLF} containing marital
status, weekly labor income of woman n′s spouse, as well as presence and number of children.
Then augmenting the wage equation by an estimate of the omitted regressor λn ≡ E[un| jn,Wn]
obtained from a first-step ordered probit of jn on Wn yields consistent estimates of 4, given W
satisfies the exclusion restriction Cov(Wn,ε jn) = 0 ∀ jn.
3.2.2. Structural Discrete Choice Model
This section develops a static discrete choice model of female labor supply to model the se-
lection into part-time, full-time, and non-employment more comprehensively. The model in-
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corporates incentives embodied in the German tax and welfare regime that affect employment
choices through a classic consumption-leisure trade-off. Separate wage functions for part-time
and full-time work are estimated jointly with individual employment choices to relax the ex-
ogeneity assumption between wages and hours (Van Soest, 1995; Francesconi, 2002; Löffler
et al., 2014). Identification builds on individual transitions between employment states, changes
in socio-demographic characteristics, and non-linearities in the tax-benefit system. The model
is estimated by full information maximum simulated likelihood (FIMSL). Given the structural
parameter estimates, one can predict the wage effect of part-time work conditional on selection
into employment and into part-time and full-time jobs.
Model
Let n again denote the individual decision maker. Each decision-maker is assumed to maximize
the instantaneous utility index U(Cn j,L j) over the choice set jn ∈ {FT,PT,OLF} according
to a consumption-leisure trade-off, where leisure in choice j is given by L j = T − h j with
weekly time endowment defined as T = (24− 8) · 5 = 80 hours and weekly working hours
derived from sample medians in the respective choice category. In the main specification based
on self-reported part-time status and contractually agreed working hours, sample medians are
h j ∈ {39,23,0} s.t. L j ∈ {41,57,80}.
The budget constraint is given by
Cn j = wn j ·h j + sn−T (wn j ·h j,sn,kn) (6)
where Cn j is consumption, wn j denotes hourly wage, sn is weekly labor income of the spouse
and T (.) is the tax-benefit system that also depends on the number of children, kn. In the
main specification, I assume an isoelastic shape of the utility index with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA),










+ εn j (7)
where γ denotes the coefficient of risk aversion and αk measures disutility of hours worked,
which may vary across decision-makers according to observable taste-shifters xn,k that include
binary indicators for the presence of young children in the household and for living in former
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East Germany. The additive random component εn j is assumed to be Type I extreme value
distributed and independent over n and j (McFadden et al., 1973). As a sensitivity check, I also
estimate the model with a more flexible translog specification of the utility index (see Appendix
B.1 for details).
Following Francesconi (2002) and in accordance with the reduced-form approach, I specify
separate wage functions for part-time and full-time work to let hourly wages vary over hours
categories j. Wages are normalized to zero in the non-employment state, wn,OLF = 0. Coun-
terfactual wage offers wFT,n and wPT,n are imputed according to full-time and part-time sector
specific log-wage equations,
ln(w jn) = Z′nγ j +ζn j (8)
where the vector Zn contains a constant and the same set of basic controls as in equation 3, γ j
is the corresponding parameter vector. Unobserved sector-specific factors ζn j are assumed to
be normal and independent of Zn and across j.
I derive net income by simulating income tax payments and transfers for each choice category
based on the tax-benefit function T (.), which incorporates detailed features of the 2005 German
tax and welfare regime (see Appendix B.2 for specifics). In particular, T (.) covers income tax
formulas, social security contributions, solidarity surcharge tax, professional and deductible
expenses, child benefits and unemployment transfers, and accounts for the joint taxation of
married couples.
Estimation
Labor supply and wage equations are estimated simultaneously by full information maximum
simulated likelihood (FIMSL). Following Van Soest (1995), I integrate out the wage equation
prediction errors ζ , which may, if ignored, lead to inconsistent estimates.11 Since the model
contains separate wage equations for full-time and part-time sectors, two types of prediction
errors must be integrated out (Francesconi, 2002). Technically, this complicates maximum
likelihood estimation because computation of the likelihood function involves solving for two
integrals over the ζ j which usually requires numerical methods. Put simply, counterfactual
11Two-step procedures such as Heckman’s two-step selection correction that impute wn by
exp(Z′nγ) implicitly assume that wages are predicted without error (Van Soest, 1995).
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wages are predicted not just once, as in standard two-step procedures, but are drawn multiple
times from the distributions of observed full-time and part-time wages. Thereby, the resulting
averages take into account various potential realizations of ζ . In practice, the integrals can be
approximated by simulated means over R independent draws from the conditional wage dis-
tributions (Van Soest, 1995). The resulting log likelihood function is given by equation (11)
in Appendix B.3 and is estimated by approximating the expectation terms via Clenshaw-Curtis
quadrature rather than by Monte-Carlo simulation. This reduces the number of draws needed
and the resulting average that approximates the expectation entails an adequate weighting func-
tion (Train, 2009). I present measures of internal goodness of fit and the full set of estimation
results in Appendices C.3 and C.2. When discussing results, I focus on the predicted part-time
wage effect.
3.2.3. Predicted Part-Time Wage Effect
Given the ‘reduced-form’ and structural coefficient estimates from the respective wage func-
tions, I predict full-time and part-time wages ŵFT,n and ŵPT,n for each decision-maker n. Anal-
ogous to equation (1), these predictions yield n′s individual part-time wage effect p̂n,
p̂n = (lŵFT,n− lŵPT,n)×100% (9)
and by averaging over all employed decision-makers, I obtain the part-time wage effect p̂ used
as a ‘benchmark’ to compare with women’s average expectations p̃.
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4. Data
This section presents the two data sets used throughout the empirical analyses, the SOEP and
the SOEP Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS). I first describe key features of the data (section 4.1)
and then define the subject pool used for estimation (section 4.2). Appendix A.2 provides
additional details on survey administration.
4.1. The SOEP and the SOEP Innovation Sample
The SOEP and the SOEP Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS) are two related longitudinal surveys
of private households in Germany, which together constitute the German Socio-Economic
Panel.12 Both the SOEP and the SOEP-IS are annual panel surveys and representative of the
German population. Sample design and field processes of both studies are almost identical;
in addition, the two surveys share a sizeable part of the questionnaire, using identical wording
to facilitate comparability. The SOEP and SOEP-IS differ in longitudinal depth, sample size,
and focus; this paper draws on both to combine the strengths of the two data sets. The larger
SOEP was launched in 1984 and comprises the life-time trajectories of approximately 15,000
households over more than 30 years. It is widely used by the general scientific community and
complements employment and earnings paths with a rich set of household characteristics and
socio-demographic indicators. The smaller SOEP Innovation Sample was established in 2011
as a supplement to the SOEP. The SOEP-IS facilitates particularly innovative research by invit-
ing users to submit their own proposals for questions, which must pass a competitive review
process before being included on the survey. The 2016 wave of the SOEP-IS introduced an
innovative module on income expectations. I utilize this module, which contains 1,057 house-
holds, to estimate expectations about the part-time wage effect for a representative sample of
employed women.13 In addition, I draw on waves 2005-2016 of the larger SOEP study, which
outperforms the SOEP-IS in longitudinal depth and sample size. Specifically, I exploit the
rich panel dimension of the full SOEP to model the endogeneity of part-time status when esti-
mating the part-time wage effect. Tables APP.1 and APP.2 in Appendix A.3 present summary
12For a jump-start on using the SOEP, see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005). For information
about the SOEP-IS, see Richter and Schupp (2012); Richter et al. (2015).
13The SOEP-IS contains about 4,000 households in total. To ensure a reasonable length of
the questionnaire but still accomodate the proposals of as many researchers as possible, the
proposed innovative modules are assigned to different subsamples. As a result, each innovative
module features only a subset of the full SOEP-IS sample.
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statistics for both SOEP and SOEP-IS samples to show the two data sets are comparable and
representative of the same population.
4.2. Sample Definition
The estimation sample contains all employed women with flexible labor supply.14 Income
expectations in the SOEP-IS were only surveyed for women who are working, but non-working
women are included to model labor force participation when estimating the part-time wage
effect using the full SOEP. Observations in the top and bottom one percent of the factual and
expected income distributions are dropped. Furthermore, I exclude workers in marginal part-
time contracts and use self-reported part-time status and contractually agreed working hours
excluding overtime in the main specification.15 I present additional results for hours-based
definitions of part-time work and weekly hours including overtime for robustness. The subject
pool contains N=286 women in the SOEP-IS sample and an unbalanced panel of N=5,492
women in the full SOEP.
14I exclude self-employed individuals, pensioners, civil servants, as well as those in training,
the military or community service.
15Marginal employment in Germany describes contracts with a maximum monthly income of
450 Euros, which are exempted from income tax obligations. These contracts are also known
as “Mini-Jobs” or “geringfügige Beschäftigung.”
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5. Results
Empirical results are presented in three steps: I start by discussing expectations about the part-
time wage effect (section 5.1). Next, I show econometric estimates of the part-time wage effect
from ‘reduced-form’ and structural discrete choice analyses (section 5.2). Third, and finally,
using the main specification of the structural model as a benchmark, I analyze if women’s
expectations align with estimated wage effects, both overall and within subgroups (section 5.3).
Throughout, the main specification is based on self-reported part-time status and contractually
agreed working hours, alternative specifications show sensitivity regarding overtime.
5.1. Expectations about the Part-Time Wage Effect
The first compelling finding is that, on average, women do not expect wage cuts for part-time
work. Estimates of the mean expected pay cut for a switch from full-time to part-time range
from 1.45 to 2.78 percent and are not statistically different from zero (Figure 1). The median
woman expects a part-time wage cut of zero, regardless of whether working hours are defined to
exclude or include overtime. The same result also holds if expectations are constructed based
on probability intervals rather than direct point estimates (see Appendix C.1). On average,
female employees expect to earn wages that are near-constant in hours worked.
Mean expectation (s.e.)
 
(1)  1.45 %  (1.43)
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Expected part-time wage effect (%)
(1) Agreed hours (2) Incl. overtime
Figure 1: Plot shows the distribution of the expected part-time wage
effect in percent for two definitions of working hours, contractually
agreed hours (1, solid line, N=219) and hours including overtime (2,
dashed line, N=226). Box shows sample mean with standard errors
(s.e.) in parentheses. SOEP-IS (2016).
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Table 2: Mean Comparison Tests of the Expected Part-Time Wage Effect (p̃)











With children 6.43 −0.84 7.26 0.02 219
Married 3.81 −5.14 8.95 0.04 188
Eastern Germany −3.40 2.40 −5.81 0.13 219
Native born 1.00 2.83 −1.83 0.58 219
Human capital
Tertiary degree −0.13 1.84 −1.97 0.59 219
Tenure > 10y. 1.94 1.20 0.74 0.80 218
Age > 40y. 0.50 2.95 −2.46 0.40 219
Job characteristics
Part-time 2.40 0.33 2.07 0.47 219
Temporary contract 3.42 1.13 2.29 0.60 218
Public sector −1.51 2.81 −4.32 0.16 219
Firm size > 200 −1.70 4.82 −6.53 0.02 216
Overtime hrs. > 0 −0.42 2.74 −3.16 0.25 218
Manager 13.80 0.73 13.07 0.04 219
Notes: SOEP-IS 2016. Two sample mean comparison tests. Dependent variable p̃n is
the expected part-time wage effect in percent. Results based on self-reported part-time
status and contractually agreed working hours.
Table 3: Multivariate Analysis of the Expected Part-Time Wage Effect (p̃): OLS Results
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.= p̃n Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Socio-demographics
With children 6.01∗ (3.56) 6.80∗ (3.79) 8.22∗∗ (3.80)
Married 8.78∗∗ (4.33) 8.57∗ (4.38) 7.60∗ (4.17)
Eastern Germany −6.69∗∗ (2.92) −5.83∗∗ (2.87) −3.80 (3.13)
Native born 1.71 (4.23) 1.30 (4.31) −0.53 (3.97)
Human capital
Education: Tertiary −3.47 (3.30) −0.40 (4.46)
Education: Basic 3.94 (4.66) 5.89 (6.22)
Tenure > 10y. 1.91 (3.40) 2.47 (3.13)
Age > 40y. −0.25 (3.88) 1.62 (3.98)
Job characteristics
Part-time −2.05 (3.17)
Temporary contract 6.60 (5.70)
Public sector −3.70 (3.04)
Firm size > 200 −4.28 (2.95)
Overtime hrs. > 0 −5.81∗∗ (2.85)
Manager 21.52∗ (10.94)
Constant yes yes yes
Occupation controls no no yes
Mean dep. variable 2.43 2.43 1.95
N 188 188 183
Notes: SOEP-IS 2016. Dependent variable p̃n is the expected part-time wage effect in percent. Es-
timates from multivariate OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Based on self-
reported part-time status and contractually agreed working hours. Base categories: intermediate edu-
cation. Model (3) with controls for 1-digit occupation (ISCO 88). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1 also reveals substantial dispersion in expectations. To understand this heterogeneity,
I disaggregate mean expectations by worker attributes (Table 2) and run multivariate OLS re-
gressions on joint characteristics to isolate conditional correlations (Table 3). Given the limited
sample size of the SOEP-IS sample, standard errors tend to be large, but point estimates are
mostly robust across specifications. Bivariate tests indicate that motherhood, marital status,
firm size, and managerial responsibily are significant correlates of heterogeneity in expecta-
tions. The correlation with motherhood is robust to the inclusion of worker characteristics in
all multivariate specifications. Mothers expect significantly larger wage penalties for working
part-time than women without children (+8.2 percent, p<0.05). Hence, the difference between
mothers and non-mothers is roughly four times the size of the population mean, which is about
two percent. Multivariate analysis also confirms that women in managerial positions expect
notably larger wage effects of part-time work than non-managers (+21.5 percent, p<0.1), the
difference in expectations between managers and non-managers exceeds the population mean
approximately by factor ten. Furthermore, women with positive overtime expect lower part-
time wage effects than those without (-5.8 percent, p<0.05) and married individuals expect
larger pay cuts than singles (+7.6 percent, p<0.1). Beyond these factors, differences in worker
attributes do not contribute much to explaining the dispersion in expectations. With the excep-
tion of mothers and managers who expect sizeable part-time wage effects, women seem to agree
that they would earn about the same wage in part-time and in full-time employment.
5.2. Estimates of the Part-Time Wage Effect
Table 4 presents estimates of the benchmark part-time wage effect, column 1 contains the main
specification with self-reported part-time status and agreed hours.
Reduced-form Estimates
Unadjusted part-time wage differentials for women in Germany reach up to 21 percent if sam-
ples include marginal part-time workers and vary between 7-10 percent once marginal part-time
is excluded (row 1). Adjusting for differences between part-time and full-time workers in terms
of basic characteristics, such as education and work experience, through OLS reduces the wage
gap to roughly four percent (rows 2 and 6). With a broad set of controls that adjust for job
segmentation, including occupational segregation and differences in sector and tenure, OLS es-
timation no longer yields significant differences in pay between part-time and full-time working
women (rows 3 and 7). Reduced-form wage equations estimated with individual fixed effects
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even yield small wage premiums for working part-time of about three percent if individual
transitions between part-time and full-time employment are used for identification (rows 4-5).
The same holds if sample selection is estimated by an ordered-probit selection rule: conditional
on selection, women are predicted to earn 2.6 percent more in part-time than in full-time (row
10). Fixed effects regression of separate wage functions for part-time and full-time workers
where within-variation in employment status is not used for identification yields a part-time
wage penalty of 5.8 percent (row 9).
Table 4: Estimates of the Part-Time Wage Effect (p̂)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Part-time wage effect (p̂) Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
1. Unadjusted (raw gap) 9.67 (0.80) 10.17 (0.78) 8.85 (0.79) 7.17 (0.77)
(A) Combined wage function
2. OLS, basic controls 4.12 (0.73) 4.74 (0.73) 2.32 (0.73) 1.02 (0.70)
3. OLS, broad controls 0.31 (0.57) 1.15 (0.58) −2.75 (0.57) −3.70 (0.56)
4. Fixed effects, basic controls −3.06 (0.56) −1.24 (0.58) −8.99 (0.64) −10.52 (0.59)
5. Fixed effects, broad controls −3.31 (0.55) −1.49 (0.56) −9.50 (0.63) −11.01 (0.58)
(B) Separate FT/PT wage functions
6. OLS, basic controls 3.90 (0.13) 4.54 (0.13) 2.30 (0.11) 2.04 (0.11)
7. OLS, broad controls 0.32 (0.11) 1.22 (0.10) −2.48 (0.11) −3.09 (0.09)
8. Fixed effects, basic controls 8.12 (0.21) 8.97 (0.20) 4.74 (0.17) 5.62 (0.16)
9. Fixed effects, broad controls 5.78 (0.22) 6.88 (0.21) 4.10 (0.19) 4.42 (0.18)
10. Ordered probit Heckman
sample selection (basic controls) −2.63 (0.12) −2.40 (0.12) −3.75 (0.10) −5.35 (0.11)
(C) Structural estimates
11. Discrete choice, CRRA utility 4.74 (0.63) 1.13 (0.66) 4.65 (0.62) 2.51 (0.66)
12. Discrete choice, Translog utility 3.56 (0.64) −0.07 (0.67) 3.79 (0.63) 1.96 (0.66)
Part-time status self-reported self-reported hours < 30 hours < 30
Working hours agreed hrs. incl. overtime agreed hrs. incl. overtime
Notes: Table presents estimates of the part-time wage effect p̂ in percent. Panel (A) gives the coefficient estimate of a binary part-time
indicator from a combined log wage regression on full- and part-time workers. Panels (B) and (C) give the mean difference in full-and
part-time log wage predictions obtained after separate full-and part-time log wage regressions. All wage regressions are based on SOEP
waves 2005-2016, with a minimum sample size of N=48,603. Predictions reported in Panels (B) and (C) are restricted to the 2016 sample
to obtain part-time wage effects for a sample that is comparable to the SOEP-IS 2016. Basic controls include years of education, linear
and quadratic work experience in part-time and full-time, region (Eastern/ Western GER) and immigrant background. Broad controls add
occupation major group (ISCO 88, 1 digit), industry (NACE,2 digit), linear and quadratic tenure and indicators for firm size > 200, public
sector and fixed term contract. Selection equation for the multinomial choice to work full-time, part-time or not at all (row 10) contains
marital status, partner income and presence and number of children. Structural estimates from multinomial logit models with separate
wage functions for part- and full-time. CRRA = constant relative risk aversion.
Structural Estimates
Estimates of the benchmark part-time wage effect based on the structural discrete choice model
range from -0.1 to 4.7 percent and, hence, are comparable in size to reduced-form estimates
(Table 4, rows 11-12). Again, I estimate wage gaps for different definitions of hourly wages
and part-time status. Additionally, I check for sensitivity regarding the functional form of the
utility index. The estimated part-time wage effect is similar across different specifications,
albeit slightly smaller if hours include overtime.
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Taken together, although point estimates vary somewhat across specifications, these findings
align with the related literature discussed in depth in section 2.4: among women, the wage
penalty for working part-time is positive but only modest in size. Most of the raw wage gap
that can be observed between full- and part-time workers is explained by differences in worker
characteristics, job segmentation, and the non-random selection of dissimilar workers into full-
time and part-time jobs. This is especially true if workers in marginal employment are excluded.
For the German case, the results relate to Wolf (2002) and Paul (2016), who find wage penalties
only for short part-time work, but a flat, if not negative, wage-hours locus for regular work
arrangements between 15-37 hours, as well as to findings by Gallego-Granados (2019) who
reports sizeable part-time wage effects at the bottom of the wage distribution, but no part-time
wage penalty for a median female worker.
5.3. Comparison of Expected and Estimated Part-Time Wage Effects
This section takes women’s expectations and compares them to estimated wage effects, us-
ing the main specification of the structural model as the benchmark. For subgroup analysis,
multivariate OLS regressions of expected and estimated part-time wage penalties condition on
worker characteristics. If there is insufficient statistical power to conduct inference for a given
subgroup, I only comment on the sign of the point estimate. I illustrate all results graphically
here and report the corresponding regression estimates in Table APP.8 in the Appendix.
Overall Comparison
Overall, expectations are quite well aligned with estimated part-time wage effects (Figure 2).
On average, the wage effect of moving between full- and part-time is small (<5 percent);
moreover, women expect almost no wage penalty (<3 percent) on average. In all four model
specifications, estimated wage effects are within the confidence bands around women’s ex-
pected wage changes, suggesting women’s expectations about the wage-hours locus are, on
average, realistic. In what follows, I further document that expected and estimated part-time
wage effects remain small and congruent if the sample is split into subgroups according to
socio-demographics, job characteristics, human capital, and occupation. Two notable excep-
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Figure 2: Comparison of expected (dashed line) and estimated (solid line) part-time
wage effect. Based on SOEP-IS and SOEP (2016) and self-reported part-time status.
Markers indicate mean wage gaps and whiskers 95% C.I.s.
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Mothers and Managers
While the average woman expects about the same wage for full- and part-time, mothers and
managers expect sizeable part-time wage penalties, as noted in section 5.1. Women with chil-
dren expect 8.2 percent stronger wage cuts for working part-time than women without children.
However, I do not find evidence that mothers truly face larger part-time wage penalties than
non-mothers. In contrast, estimates indicate that mothers experience significantly lower wage
effects when they work part-time than women without children; perhaps because it is socially
less accepted if a woman without children opts for a part-time contract (-2.5, p<0.1, Figure
3a). Hence, mothers overestimate the part-time wage effect, possibly because they internal-
ize the second-order consequences of part-time employment, such as reduced career progres-
sion. The second group of women who reports large expected part-time wage effects are man-
agers. Women with managerial responsibilities expect 21.5 percent stronger wage reductions
for working part-time than non-managers. Given the small number of women in executive po-
sitions in the SOEP-IS sample, standard errors are substantial, but one can say with confidence
that managers expect above-zero part-time wage effects. This mirrors the pattern in estimated
part-time wage effects for women with managerial tasks. In fact, the only group for whom es-
timated wage effects are significantly positive are managers (+7.5, p<0.1, Figure 3b). Hence,
women in executive positions face notable wage cuts when they transition from full- to part-
time and they also expect a part-time wage effect. This relates to the job-mobility argument by
Manning and Petrongolo (2008) and others: women in positions that are not deemed ‘part-time
compatible’ face an occupational downward move when switching from full- to part-time and,
in turn, undergo cuts in hourly pay. Here I show that women who are particularly likely to
suffer mobility-induced wage losses also fear these wage cuts most.
Socio-Demographics
If the sample is split by region into former East and West German states, expected and predicted
part-time wage effects do not differ significantly, although the point estimate suggests that
women in Eastern Germany view part-time employment somewhat more favorably, suggesting
a role for institutions and norms for shaping individuals’ beliefs (Figure 3a). Women in Eastern
Germany are significantly more likely to work full-time and they tend to have shorter career
breaks when they have children. Point estimates indicate that easterners do not view part-
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Figure 3: Group differences in expected (dashed line) and estimated (solid line) part-time wage effect from mul-
tivariate OLS. Based on SOEP-IS and SOEP (2016) and self-reported part-time status. Markers indicate point
estimates and whiskers 95% C.I.s.
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solution. In contrast, a move from full-to part-time is often permanent in Western Germany,
partly because child care infrastructure remains less developed. These differences exemplify
the ‘dual nature’ of part-time work discussed by Connolly and Gregory (2010), who argue that
spells of part-time employment can be both “a support (...) and a trap to a successful career,”
depending on whether these spells are short “interludes,” as is the more common pattern in
Eastern Germany, or whether part-time work becomes the norm in alternation with periods of
non-employment, as is often the case in Western Germany. When disaggregating workers by
other socio-demographic characteristics, such as immigrant background or marital status, point
estimates of the expected and estimated part-time wage effects remain aligned, as in the overall
sample.
Job Characteristics
Part-time workers expect to gain less from switching to full-time than full-time workers expect
to lose from moving to part-time (point estimate), mirroring the asymmetric pattern in esti-
mated part-time penalties (Figure 3b). On average, part-time workers have accumulated more
part-time work experience, which is not rewarded in full-time positions (see Table APP.6 and
also compare Blundell et al. (2016)). For an average part-time worker, the benefits of moving
to a full-time job are not immediate but will only materialize once she accumulates additional
work experience in full-time. Results also show that public sector employees and individu-
als in larger firms do not fear part-time work as much as employees in the private sector and
in smaller firms (point estimate), but estimates indicate no differential remuneration of part-
time work across these groups. Women with fixed-term contracts expect larger part-time wage
effects than women with permanent contracts (point estimate). These results, in line with previ-
ous work by Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011), confirm that women in these types
of secondary work arrangements indeed face larger part-time wage penalties. I also find that
women who work overtime see part-time work more favorably than women without overtime
(point estimate), suggesting they expect more overtime in full-time work. Although full-time
workers report significantly more overtime in absolute terms - 1.1 hours more per week, on
average (p<0.05) - when computed in relation to current working hours, part-timers work rel-
atively more overtime, namely roughly one percentage point more (p<0.05), rationalizing why
part-time penalties effectively do not differ between these groups.
Human Capital
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Women with higher levels of firm-specific human capital (tenure above 10 years) are predicted
to lose more by moving to part-time and they also expect larger penalties (Figure 3c). This
again relates to the argument by Manning and Petrongolo (2008) who point out that women
risk an occupational downwards-move and may have to change their employer if part-time
contracts are not easily available. The results are also in line with Gallego-Granados (2019),
confirming larger predicted wage penalties for women with low levels of education who tend
to be found at the bottom of the wage distribution. These women also report larger expected
wage cuts.
Occupation
In Figure 3d, I examine group differences across broad measures of occupation, based on one-
digit ISCO-1988. For six out of eight occupational subgroups, the signs of the expected and
predicted part-time penalties correspond.16 I take this as suggestive evidence that employees
are, on average, aware of occupation-specific gaps in the returns to full-time and part-time
work. However, occupation-specific mean expectations are slightly larger in absolute terms
than respective estimates. Put differently, in occupations where part-time wage effects persist,
women also expect part-time penalties, but their expectations tend to exceed the estimated wage
effect. The results also imply that although there is some variation across broad occupation
groups, the predicted wage penalty for switching from full- to part-time is very small overall,
confirming the main finding and previous findings from the literature for female workers. More
detailed measures of occupation that distinguish different levels of task complexity yield larger
variability, but the overall picture does not change.
16The signs deviate for agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO-6) as well as craft and related




In this paper, I analyze the wage expectations of women for part-time and full-time employment
and evaluate if women’s beliefs about the part-time wage effect are correct. Using represen-
tative German survey data, I document that women, on average, expect only minor part-time
wage penalties that are statistically not different from zero. I show these beliefs are realistic,
given first-order part-time wage effects for women are negligible overall (confirming findings
across countries, among others Wolf, 2002; Aaronson and French, 2004; Hirsch, 2005; Hardoy
and Schøne, 2006; Booth and Wood, 2008; Fouarge and Muffels, 2009; Gallego-Granados,
2019).
On the one hand, these findings are reassuring from a policy perspective, because many women
value part-time work (Wippermann, 2018) and spells of part-time employment can support a
woman’s career by maintaining labor force attachment (Connolly and Gregory, 2010). How-
ever, as part-time work becomes persistent, it can harm workers in the long-run by creat-
ing second-order effects. The reasons are manifold and include the lack of transferability of
work experience from part- to full-time employment, causing steeper wage growth in full-time
(Francesconi, 2002; Blundell et al., 2016), or different rates of promotions in jobs where ‘being
around when others are’ is rewarded disproportionately, ultimately driving up gender wage gaps
(Goldin, 2014). Not least, even with constant wage rates, part-time workers accumulate lower
pension entitlements across the life-cycle, contributing to gender pension gaps (Frericks et al.,
2009; Hammerschmid and Rowold, 2019). Taken together, whilst short interludes of part-time
work are innocuous, a growing consensus emerges that persistent part-time employment should
be avoided. The findings from this paper provide new insights explaining both mobility and
persistence in working hours observed in many OECD labor markets. The beliefs documented
here can rationalize why few women hesitate to reduce hours to engage in care work, at the
same time, they explain why many postpone returning to full-time after spending years in part-
time employment, thereby harming their long-term labor market outcomes. If women expect
no direct wage impact of switching between full- and part-time, there exist no first-order wage
incentives to prefer full- over part-time in a given period. Among agents who prioritize present
over future rewards, the lack of first-order wage effects can create an indifference between re-
maining in part-time just a bit longer and resuming a full-time job, ultimately driving persistent
part-time employment. Hence, beyond other factors, wage expectations deliver an important
mechanism explaining key labor supply choices women face over the life-cycle.
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Appendix
A Data: Further Details
A.1 Expectations Survey
Below is a description of the survey instrument used to elicit expectations of full-time workers
about counterfactual earnings in part-time. Part-time workers are asked to consider the opposite
scenario of switching to a full-time position of 40 hours per week.
Please imagine you were to switch to a part-time job from now on working 20 hours
per week. Please only consider part-time jobs that you could carry out with your
qualification.
(a) Which monthly gross income do you expect to earn when working part-time at 20
hours per week?
(b) How likely do you think it is that a part-time position at 20 hours per week yields
a gross income of less than X-20% per month?∗
(c) How likely do you think it is that a part-time position at 20 hours per week yields
a gross income of more than X+20% per month?∗
∗Please report your answer in percent. 0% means you consider it impossible, 100%
means that you are certain. You can use the percent values in between to graduate your
answer. [Note: X is the individual-specific response to (a)]
A.2 Survey Administration
This section describes key features of the sample design and field work of the SOEP and the
SOEP Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS), which together constitute the German Socio-Economic
Panel.
For both the SOEP and the SOEP-IS surveys, participating households were initially selected
through multi-stage random sampling with regional clustering. Face-to-face interviews take
place once a year and last approximately 1.5-2 hours. Participants receive small gifts upon
completion of each interview, as well as small cash incentives. Households either receive 5
Euros per completed personal interview and 10 Euros per household interview, or they receive
a lottery ticket for the charitable TV lottery “Ein Platz an der Sonne” (A place in the sun).
Administration of both surveys lies with the German Institute for Economic Research, DIW
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Berlin, but Kantar Public (formerly TNS Infratest) is responsible for the field work, includ-
ing software programming, interviewer recruitment, interviewer training, and coordination of
interviews.
A.3 Sample Comparison of SOEP and SOEP-IS
Table APP.1 displays summary statistics for the full sample of women surveyed in the SOEP-
IS and the SOEP (2016) to demonstrate that samples are comparable and representative of the
same population. Table APP.2 shows the equivalent analysis for the restricted samples used in
estimation.
Table APP.1: Composition of SOEP and SOEP-IS (2016): All Women
SOEP SOEP-IS p-value (∆)
Gross wage 15.56 16.14 0.28
Agreed weekly hrs. 29.90 29.00 0.22
Overtime hrs. per week 2.50 2.65 0.60
Education in years 12.22 12.12 0.25
Tenure in years 9.90 10.25 0.54
Public sector (yes/no) 0.30 0.29 0.86
Firm size > 200 (yes/no) 0.49 0.49 0.92
Temporary contract (yes/no) 0.18 0.16 0.53
Age in years 51.75 49.79 0.01
Eastern Germany (yes/no) 0.18 0.18 0.79
With children (yes/no) 0.24 0.23 0.63
Native born (yes/no) 0.83 0.82 0.64
N 15,077 792
Notes: SOEP and SOEP-IS (2016). Sample averages with population
weights. P-value from two sample mean comparison test of the mean dif-
ference ∆.
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Table APP.2: Composition of SOEP and SOEP-IS (2016): Estimation Sample
SOEP SOEP-IS p-value (∆)
Gross wage 16.23 16.52 0.62
Agreed weekly hrs. 31.78 30.82 0.18
Overtime hrs. per week 2.71 2.80 0.76
Education in years 12.71 12.47 0.08
Tenure in years 10.42 10.16 0.69
Public sector (yes/no) 0.26 0.28 0.56
Firm size >200 (yes/no) 0.50 0.50 0.96
Temporary contract (yes/no) 0.13 0.14 0.76
Age in years 44.26 43.50 0.33
Eastern Germany (yes/no) 0.18 0.17 0.64
With children (yes/no) 0.30 0.30 0.84
Native born (yes/no) 0.82 0.82 0.88
N 5,492 286
Notes: SOEP and SOEP-IS (2016). Sample averages with population
weights. Estimation sample excludes women who are not working, self-
employed, in marginal employment, civil servants, pensioners, in training,
in community service or in the military.
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B Model: Further Details
B.1 Translog Utility Index
The translog specification takes the following form:





kxn,k) ·L j + εn j
where β collects the coefficients of the linear and the non-linear terms by which the natural
logarithms of Cn j and L j enter utility; see also Van Soest (1995) . As before, αk measures
the utility from leisure, which depends on observable taste-shifters xn,k. The additive random
component εn is assumed to be iid Type I extreme value distributed.
B.2 Tax and Welfare Regime
The model implements details of the 2005 German tax and benefit system based on features of
the German Tax and Benefit Microsimulation Model (STSM) described in Steiner et al. (2012)
to simulate net income for each employment choice, following three steps: First, I subtract
professional and deductible expenses to derive taxable income. Second, I calculate income tax
liability by applying tax formulas depending on marital status. Finally, I deduct liabilities from
gross income and add transfers to obtain net income.
To obtain taxable income in step one, gross labor income of the household is converted into
real terms (base year 2005) and aggregated to annual amounts. For counterfactual choice cate-
gories, I derive alternative-specific gross earnings by multiplying hours times the hourly wage
rate that is allowed to vary across full-time and part-time choices. I disregard income compo-
nents from alternative sources such as capital income or income from renting and leasing.17
Given gross annual real income, I deduct the lump-sum amount of 920 Euros for professional
expenses (“Werbungskosten”) for all workers. In addition, actual or lump-sum deductible ex-
penses (“Sonderausgaben”) are subtracted up to a maximum amount. I simplify this step and
consider only the general flat rate amount of 36 Euros (“Pauschbetrag”) as well as expenses for
social security contributions.18 Table APP.3 presents detailed information on how deductible
17Since I exclude pensioners and self-employed women, I also disregard income from pen-
sions or self-employment.
18I abstract from other deductible expenses such as insurance contributions, alimony pay-
ments, church tax, expenses for training, donations and tax consultancy expenses
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expenses are accounted for. For simplicity, the model does not incorporate loss deductions and
extraordinary deductable expenses (“aussergewöhnliche Belastungen”). One further simplifi-
cation I resume to involves the distinction between child allowances that are deducted before
applying the tax function and child benefits (“Kindergeld”), which are added afterwards. A
more accurate account of the tax-benefit system would conduct a higher-yield test (“Günstiger-
prüfung”) and assign the more favorable rule (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2008). I abstract from this
distinction and assume all couples with children receive child benefits.
Table APP.3: Annual Deductable Expenses for Social Security Contributions in 2005
Single individual Married couple
Minimum (“Vorsorgepauschale”) 0.2 ·RV + min(0.12 · INC,1900) 0.2 ·RVHH + min(0.12 · INCHH ,3800)
Actual expenses
Bracket 1 (“Diff. Vorwegabzug”) max(0,3068−0.16 · INC) max(0,6136−0.16 · INCHH)
Bracket 2 min(1334,SV −Bracket 1) min(2668,SV −Bracket 1)
Bracket 3 min(667,SV −Bracket 1−Bracket 2) min(1334,SV −Bracket 1−Bracket 2)
Maximum 2001 4002
Notes: All amounts in Euros and annual terms. RV= old age pension contributions (“Rentenversicherung”). HH= household level. INC=
gross income. SV= total social security contributions (“Sozialversicherung”). Old age (RV) contributions deductable up to a correction
factor (20% in 2005)
Given taxable income, I obtain income tax liability of the household in step two. In Germany,
due to the joint taxation of married couples (“Ehegattensplitting”), singles and married individ-
uals are taxed differently. For singles, income tax formulas are applied directly to individual
taxable income. For married couples, total taxable income of the household is first divided by
two. Income tax formulas are then applied to half the amount of total taxable household in-
come. The derived tax liability is then doubled to determine overall tax liability of the couple.
Table APP.4 contains income tax formulas as well as minimal and maximal marginal tax rates
for all available tax brackets. Income is not taxed below an annual allowance of 7,664 Euros
and tax rates evolve according to a partially linear rule until a top income threshold of 52,152
Euros after which income is taxed at a constant marginal rate of 42%.
Table APP.4: Income Tax Formula in 2005 (§ 32 a Abs. 1 EStG)
Zone Tax bracket Tax formula MTR (min) MTR (max)
1 ≤ 7664 t=0 0 0
2 7665-12739 t=(883.74Y + 1500)Y 15% 23.97%
3 12740-52151 t=(228.74Z + 2397)Z + 989 23.97% 42%
4 ≥ 52152 t=0.42X - 7914 42% 42%
Notes: Income and tax liabilities refer to annual Euro amounts. MTR = marginal tax rate. Y
and Z are 1/10000 of excess income over upper bound of the previous bracket. X is taxable
income.
In step three, I compute net income by deducting income tax, social security contributions, and
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the solidarity surcharge ("Solidaritätszuschlag")19 from gross income and by adding transfers
and benefits. I calculate unemployment benefits according to ALG II standard rates (“Regelbe-
darfssätze”) that differ between East and West German regions and by household composition
(Table APP.5). Payments are means-tested and individuals are only eligible for unemployment
transfers if joint household income, including spousal income, is lower than transfer claims
and if household assets are below exempted wealth allowances. I simplify the means-test by
assuming households are ineligible for social assistance as soon as one spouse has positive
labor income. In accordance with the STSM, I do not model payments from unemployment
insurance (ALG I).20 Child benefits are added once for each couple (the first three children
receive 154 Euros each, all additional children receive 179 Euros each). I refrain from covering
any additional benefits (e.g. allowances for housing, education, widows etc.).
Table APP.5: Unemployment Benefit Standard Rates in 2005 (SGB II/Hartz IV and SGB XII)
Single adults (I) Adults in couples (II) Youth 14 - 18 (III) Children < 14 (IV)
East 331 298 265 199
West 345 311 276 207
Notes: Monthly allowances per person in Euros.
B.3 Simulated Log Likelihood Function
If full-time and part-time wages were observed for all individuals, including non-workers, the




















where the first summand denotes the likelihood contributions from logit choice probabilities
over hours choices and the second term gives the likelihood of the wage equation residuals,
assuming log-normality, where φ(.) is the normal density.
Accounting for unobserved wage offers, two types of prediction errors must be integrated out,
resulting in the following simulated log-likelihood function:
19Solidarity surcharge of 5.5% on tax liability accrues for couples (individuals) owing above
1944 (972) Euros annual tax.
20Individuals who worked in the previous year are, in principle, entitled to payments from
unemployment insurance for the first 6 months after becoming unemployed. These payments
are not means-tested and replace 60-67% of previous net income. I follow the STSM and
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(r)
n j )
denotes the simulated logit choice probability from draw r ∈ R.
wFT,(r)n and w
PT,(r)
n ∈ x(r)n j are simulated full-time and part-time wage offers.
A full information maximum simulated likelihood estimator is given by






Here I show that constructing expected part-time wage effects from probability intervals yields
similar point estimates as when asking for numerical Euro amounts directly. I use respondents’
subjective probabilities for earning less than 80 percent and more than 120 percent of their nu-
meric point estimate to construct individual-specific probability distributions (Figures APP.1,
APP.2). I use non-parametric spline interpolation that allows for flexible approximations to in-
dividuals’ subjective distributions, which outperforms parametric approximations (Bellemare
et al., 2012). From these fitted distributions, I derive alternative measures of central tendency
(subjective means and medians). I show subjective means and medians also center symmet-
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Figure APP.1: Mean discrete subjective cumulative
density functions (C.D.F.s) for expected wages based
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Figure APP.2: Interpolated smooth subjective C.D.F.s
for expected part-time wage effect from subjective
probabilities and non-parametric piecewise cubic her-
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Figure APP.3: Distribution of central tendency, compar-
ing reported point estimates (grey), interpolated medi-
ans (red), and interpolated mean (green). Interpolation
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Figure APP.4: Distribution of subjective quantiles,
based on probabilistic questions and non-parametric
spline interpolation. SOEP-IS (2016).
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C.2 FIMSL Estimation Results
Table APP.6 presents the full set of estimation results of the discrete choice model for different
specifications of part-time status and working hours, using a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility index.
Table APP.6: FIMSL Estimation Results of the Discrete Choice Model
PT status: self-reported (1) Agreed hours (2) Incl. overtime
Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time
Log wages Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Education (years) 0.091 0.001 0.090 0.001 0.091 0.001 0.087 0.001
FT experience (years) 0.030 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.030 0.001
FT experience sq. 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000
PT experience (years) 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.001 −0.003 0.001 0.016 0.001
PT experience sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
East −0.282 0.003 −0.261 0.004 −0.287 0.004 −0.267 0.004
Foreign born −0.061 0.004 −0.050 0.004 −0.066 0.004 −0.052 0.004
Constant 1.140 0.009 1.060 0.010 0.994 0.011 1.018 0.012
Std.Dev. 0.076 0.001 0.090 0.001 0.087 0.001 0.102 0.001
Hours choice Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Consumption 0.124 0.003 0.138 0.003
Hours 0.038 0.001 0.036 0.001
Hours × Kids 0.041 0.001 0.039 0.001
Hours × East −0.018 0.001 −0.017 0.001
Log likelihood 167219.180 186678.8172
PT status: hours-based (3) Agreed hours (4) Incl. overtime
Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time
Log wages Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Education (years) 0.090 0.001 0.091 0.001 0.092 0.001 0.086 0.001
FT experience (years) 0.030 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.028 0.001
FT experience sq. 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000
PT experience (years) 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.001
PT experience sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
East −0.280 0.003 −0.261 0.004 −0.279 0.004 −0.277 0.005
Foreign born −0.064 0.004 −0.048 0.004 −0.068 0.004 −0.051 0.004
Constant 1.145 0.009 1.060 0.010 0.976 0.010 1.028 0.011
Std.Dev. 0.077 0.001 0.090 0.001 0.093 0.001 0.098 0.001
Hours choice Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Consumption 0.120 0.003 0.149 0.003
Hours 0.037 0.001 0.035 0.001
Hours × Kids 0.043 0.001 0.041 0.001
Hours × East −0.019 0.001 −0.021 0.001
Log likelihood 167485.728 186786.764
Notes: SOEP (2005-2016). Results from full information maximum simulated likelihood (FIMSL) estimation with constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility index.
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C.3 Internal Goodness of Fit
I present graphical evidence of model fit (Figure APP.5) and estimated wage elasticities (Table
APP.7) for the main specification of the discrete choice model with self-reported part-time
status, agreed working hours, and a CRRA utility index.
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Figure APP.5: Goodness of Fit of the Discrete Choice Model
C.3.2. Wage Elasticities
Estimated elasticities for a one percent increase in gross hourly wage for females in the sample
are 0.41 percent for working hours and 0.22 percentage points for participation. These elas-
ticities are mostly within the confidence intervals of comparable estimates by Haan (2006),
deviations can be explained by differences in sample composition, most notably I include sin-
gles whereas Haan (2006) focuses on married couples.
Table APP.7: Labor Supply Elasticities
∆ Hours (percent) ∆ Participation (p.p.)
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
All women 0.41 0.00 0.22 0.02
By region
East 0.34 0.00 0.25 0.04
West 0.43 0.00 0.21 0.02
Notes: Predicted changes for a 1% increase in gross hourly
wage.
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C.4 Multivariate OLS Results on Group Differences
Table APP.8 presents the full set of multivariate OLS estimates corresponding to the graphical
evidence in Figure 3 in section 5.3.
Table APP.8: Multivariate Analysis of Expected and Estimated Part-Time Wage Effects
(1) Expected (2) CRRA estimates (3) Translog estimates
Dep. Var. = part-time wage effect Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Socio-demographics
With children 8.22∗∗ (3.80) −2.52∗ (1.35) −2.53∗ (1.37)
Married 7.60∗ (4.17) 1.04 (1.40) 1.09 (1.43)
Eastern Germany −3.80 (3.13) 2.03 (1.60) 2.61 (1.63)
Native born −0.53 (3.97) −1.80 (1.51) −2.16 (1.53)
Human capital
Education: Tertiary −0.40 (4.46) 0.28 (1.84) 0.56 (1.87)
Education: Basic 5.89 (6.22) 2.06 (1.74) 1.97 (1.77)
Tenure > 10y. 2.47 (3.13) 3.11∗∗ (1.46) 3.18∗∗ (1.49)
Age > 40y. 1.62 (3.98) −2.04 (1.43) −2.75∗ (1.46)
Job characteristics
Part-time −2.05 (3.17) −9.23∗∗∗ (1.39) −11.52∗∗∗ (1.41)
Temporary contract 6.60 (5.70) 3.06 (1.98) 3.26 (2.01)
Public sector −3.70 (3.04) 0.66 (1.52) 0.53 (1.55)
Firm size > 200 −4.28 (2.95) 0.97 (1.32) 1.00 (1.34)
Overtime hrs. > 0 −5.81∗∗ (2.85) −1.14 (1.30) −1.14 (1.32)
Manager 21.52∗ (10.94) 7.49∗ (3.86) 7.51∗ (3.93)
Occupation (ISCO 88)
ISCO 88 -1 −9.13 (15.11) −2.25 (4.67) −2.23 (4.76)
ISCO 88 -2 5.39 (10.27) 1.49 (3.27) 1.40 (3.33)
ISCO 88 -3 9.20 (9.81) 3.29 (2.69) 3.47 (2.74)
ISCO 88 -4 5.13 (10.25) 2.11 (2.93) 2.22 (2.99)
ISCO 88 -5 9.83 (10.37) 0.97 (2.71) 0.98 (2.76)
ISCO 88 -6 17.52∗ (9.04) −1.88 (7.92) −2.04 (8.08)
ISCO 88 -7 −12.73 (14.94) 7.28∗ (4.37) 7.45∗ (4.45)
ISCO 88 -8 2.32 (11.84) 2.16 (4.22) 2.47 (4.29)
Mean dep. variable (s.e.) 1.45 (1.43) 4.74 (0.63) 3.56 (0.64)
Constant yes yes yes
N 183 4,488 4,488
Notes: SOEP-IS and SOEP (2016). Dependent variable is the expected (1) or estimated (2,3) part-time wage effect in
percent. Estimates from multivariate OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Based on self-reported
part-time status and contractually agreed working hours. Base categories: intermediate education and ISCO-88-9. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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